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ABTRACT:  This paper examines issues related to the economic impact of sports 
championships on the local economy of host cities. While boosters frequently claim a 
large positive effect of such championships, a closer examination leads to the conclusion 
that the impact is likely much smaller than touted and may even be negative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  Economics has frequently been used as a rationale in defense of public subsidies 
for professional sports.  Subsidy advocates argue that new teams and/or stadiums provide 
an economic stimulus, and public support for professional sports should be construed as 
an investment rather than expenditure.  This proposition is thought to be particularly true 
when the public subventions for sport produce championship teams.  Two issues need to 
be analyzed in conjunction with this thesis.  First, do greater subsidies translate into more 
frequent championships?  Second, do sports championships correspond to higher levels 
of economic activity?  The purpose of this report is to provide answers to these questions. 
 
  A direct correlation between subsidies and championships has theoretical appeal.  
In this era of free agency, compelling evidence exists to support the thesis.  Teams that 
finish high in the financial standings have the resources to compete for the players that 
have the capacity to win.  For example, using statistics provided by Major League 
Baseball (MLB) for the 2001 season, eleven of the fourteen teams with losing records 
correspond to those teams in the bottom half of stadium revenues (MLB, 2001).  An 
equally convincing case can be made for the second thesis on several levels.  Post-season 
games mean more spending not only because there are more contests, but also heightened 
fan interest very likely translates into additional expenditures.  Furthermore, if people feel 
better as a consequence of their team’s success, it is arguable that they are more 
productive.     
 
  The pursuit of championships comes at some costs, however, some of which are 
not obvious.  In particular the following should be noted: 
 
  (1) Building a new stadium provides a team with a financial advantage only if 
other teams are not adopting the same strategy. 
 
  (2) The additional revenues must be spent on players to enable the team to 
become more competitive on the field. 
 
  (3) During the construction phase of a stadium project, the costs associated with 
economic dislocation due to construction may exceed the benefits associated with the 
expenditure.  The closer the economy is to full employment prior to the project, the more 
likely this is to be the case.  
 
  (4) Sport is a diversion, and the additional games may capture the attention of 
workers to the point where economic activity falters rather than accelerates as a 
consequence of post-season play.  Just as success in the playoffs may contribute 
positively to worker morale and productivity, a lack of success may have the opposite 
effect.  In fact, only the city hosting the champion can claim a warm, fuzzy feeling for 
their fans.   
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  (5) Celebrations, both formal and informal, are held in the host city to honor the 
championship team.  The increasingly intense and destructive informal celebrations are 
costly. 
 
(6) What does a championship mean to the fans?  The evidence suggests that they 
pay for the championship before and after.  Basking in the glow of the team’s success 
does come at some expense. 
 
The paper’s is organized in accordance with these six points.        
 
 
FALLACY OF COMPOSITION 
 
  It is well known that the behavior or actions of an individual economic actor 
produce different than the same behavior for a group of economic actors.  One person 
standing at a football game does not alter viewing much for the fans in the row behind, 
but if an entire row decides to stand, it compels a reaction from the row behind.  The 
fallacy of composition has application for issues relating to stadium construction and the 
pursuit of professional sports championships.  Simply put, if a team is not competitive 
financially, then it cannot bid for the free-agent talent essential for being competitive on 
the field.  The construction of a new stadium, while a necessary condition for athletic 
success, is not sufficient.  The new venue confers a sustainable financial advantage to the 
team only if other teams do not adopt the same strategy.  This is true for those 
professional sports teams that belong to leagues that have the most comprehensive 
revenue sharing programs, the National Football League (NFL), and it is also true for 
MLB, the league that arguably has least extensive revenue sharing arrangement.   
 
  In Table 1 information has been recorded relating to the effect a new stadium has 
had on the competitiveness of teams.   4
 
Table 1 
New Stadiums and Team Competitiveness for MLB 
 
Field  City  Year Opened  First Playoff 
Appearance 
Great American  Cincinnati  2003  - 
PNC Park  Pittsburgh  2001  - 
Miller Park  Milwaukee  2001  - 
Invesco Field  Detroit  2001  - 
Minute Maid Field  Houston  2000  2001 
Pac-Bell Stadium  San Francisco  2000  2000 
Safeco Park  Seattle  1999  2000 
Tropicana Field  Tampa   1990/1998  - 
Bank One Park  Phoenix  1998  1999 
Turner Field  Atlanta  1996  1996 
Coors Field  Denver  1995  1995 
Jacobs Field  Cleveland  1994  1995 
Ballpark at 
Arlington 
Dallas/Fort Worth  1994  1996 
Camden Yards  Baltimore  1992  1995 
U.S. Cellular 
(Comiskey) 
Chicago (AL)  1991  1992 
Sky Dome  Toronto  1989  1991 
 
 
  The information indicates that shortly after the teams built new stadiums they 
became playoff contenders.  The connection between new stadiums and team success is 
clear and is attributable to increased team payrolls (as the information in Table 2 
indicates.)  Following the open of the SkyDome in Toronto in 1989 the Blue Jays won 
World Series in 1992 and 1993 with baseball’s largest payroll. Baltimore, near the 
bottom of league payrolls in 1992, had the second largest team payroll by 1995 following 
the opening of Camden Yards in 1992. Finally, Cleveland probably presents the greatest 
success story of stadium construction leading to on-field success. The Cleveland Indians, 
with one of baseball’s three lowest payrolls in 1992 and 1993 and a 50-year record of 
post-season futility, turned around their franchise after the construction of Jacobs Field in 
1994. The Indians were among the top three franchises in payroll in 1996 and 1997 and 
made World Series appearances in 1995 and 1997. In fact, on-field success following the 
opening was the rule, not the exception, during the early period of MLB’s recent stadium 
construction boom. Of the 12 teams building new stadiums between 1989 and 2000, 11 
made playoff appearances within 2 years of the construction of the stadium. Only Tampa 
Bay, a 1998 expansion franchise, and Baltimore, whose potential playoff appearance was 
postponed by a year due to the 1994 MLB players’ strike, defied the pattern. 
 
  As more and more of baseball’s infrastructure has been replaced in the last 
decade, however, it has become increasingly difficult for a new stadium to confer a   5
competitive edge. With 17 teams playing in facilities constructed or significantly 
renovated since 1989, and another 8 teams with plans for new stadiums, it is clear that not 
every team with a new stadium can support an above average payroll and the above 
average on-field performance that accompanies a large payroll. Since MLB allows for 
only eight teams to participate in the postseason, it is simply impossible for every team 
with a new stadium to qualify for the playoffs. It is likely that the early on-field success 
that accompanied teams such as the Blue Jays, Indians, Orioles, and Rangers, who built 
new stadiums in the early stages of the building boom, will not necessarily accrue to the 
most recent builders.  
 
  The evidence indicates that in the early years of this construction cycle, stadiums 
conferred an edge, which dissipated in part as a consequence of newer stadiums coming 
into existence.  Winning in professional sports is by definition a zero-sum game, and the 
competitive advantage conferred by new stadiums is diluted by new ballparks.  The 
experience of the teams in the most recently constructed stadiums demonstrates this 
pattern.  Why? 
 
 
NEW STADIUM REVENUES AND PAYROLLS:  THE RECENT EXPERIENCE 
 
  In the earlier stages of the stadium construction boom, new stadium revenues 
translated into higher player salaries and a postseason experience.  The Milwaukee 
Brewers, Detroit Tigers, and Pittsburgh Pirates, who have yet to make the post-season 
since the construction of their stadiums and appear unlikely to make the playoffs any time 
in the near future, broke the pattern through not using new stadium revenues to acquire 
the free agents that would make them competitive.  The information recorded in Table 2 
























































































































































































Average    (57) (73)  (125)  (147) 
Source:  USATODAY.com Baseball salaries database. 
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The information recorded in Table 5 indicates that with few exceptions team 
payrolls increased rather substantially after a new stadium is built and sustained for 
several years following the inaugural season.  The exceptions are for the stadiums built 
since 2000 in Detroit, Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh where payroll increases at the time 
those stadiums began operating were not maintained in subsequent seasons.  The lesson is 
that a new stadium is not sufficient to produce a play-off caliber team.  The incremental 
revenue generated by a new stadium does provide the potential for a more competitive 
team, but it is necessary that the money be used for payroll.  For teams that do not use the 
money in this way, they risk alienating their fans thereby reducing the revenue enhancing 
novelty effect associated with new venues.  Falling attendance in Milwaukee, Detroit, 
and Pittsburgh the year after the inaugural season for their new ballparks supports this 
proposition.  An opportunity may have well been lost for all these cities at least until the 
next round of new stadium construction. The continual appearance of new facilities also 
makes it difficult for existing teams with newer stadiums to sustain their success.  
 
 
INDIRECT STADIUM CONSTRUCTION COSTS 
 
  It is widely believed that cities benefit from the construction of a stadium.  Money 
is spent and resources are employed during the construction phase of the project.  
Theoretically the extent to which the city benefits during construction depends on several 
things.  First, the public money spent must not only generate benefit in a gross sense, but 
the benefit net of those benefits derived from the next best alternative use of those funds 
must be positive.  In other words the project must represent the most efficacious use of 
money devoted to it.  Second, the project must utilize resources that reside in the 
metropolitan area.  To the extent that construction resources reside elsewhere, there may 
be a transfer of income from the city when resources repatriate their earnings to their 
primary residences.  Firms that specialize in stadium construction exhibit a national or 
even international character given the specialized nature of the industry.  For example, 
only one of the four firms involved in the construction of Miller Park in Milwaukee was 
headquartered in Milwaukee.  The four firms included:  Huber, Hunt & Nichols Inc. 
(Indianapolis), Clark Construction (Chicago), Hunzinger Construction (Milwaukee), and 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of America.  Third, the amount of slack in the local 
economy will determine the extent to which the value created through construction is 
local in character.  The closer the local economy is to full employment, the more likely 
resources used will be non-local. 
 
  Furthermore, large construction projects disrupt local economies.  Traffic is 
diverted, and commercial interests within the construction zone suffer.  Evidence from 
the City of Los Angeles during the construction phase of the Staples Center supports the 
contention that the net economic of a sports facility during the construction phase may be 




The Economic Impact of the Staples Center During the Construction Phase 
 










1998.2 42.25  42.11 15,825  22.042 
1998.3 41.79  42.13 16,064  -55.781 
1998.4 41.64  41.91 17,032  -46.707 
1999.1 41.97  41.81 15,498  24.953 
1999.2 41.86  41.88 17,022 -3.737 
1999.3 41.41  41.79 17,304  -65.758 
Average      -20.831 
   






   Rt = β0 + β1 Rt-1 + β2 RODNEY + β3 TIMEt + β4 TIMEt
2 + εt 
 
  where for each time period t, 
 R t         = the City of Los Angeles’ ratio of taxable sales to the taxable sales in  
          the rest of the County of Los Angeles in time period t, 
  RODNEY = dummy variable representing the effect of the Rodney King riots, 
  T I M E t        = linear time trend, 
  T I M E t
2        = quadratic time trend, 
  εt        = stochastic error. 
 
 
POST SEASON BENEFITS? 
 
  During championship runs, league officials and team boosters are quick to publish 
official sounding claims of the economic benefits that a city derives from hosting these 
sporting mega-events. The NFL typically claims an economic impact from the Super 
Bowl in the neighborhood of $300 to $400 million. Estimates from hosting a World 
Series and the preceding playoffs games range as high as $250 million with predictions 
for the impact of the NBA and NHL finals generally coming in somewhat lower.  
 
  Numerous scholars have attempted to estimate the impact of large sporting events 
and league championships on host cities.  Baade and Matheson (2001) use employment   9
and taxable sales data to find the effect of MLB's All-Star Game metropolitan areas. 
Porter (1999) uses taxable sales data determine the implications of hosting the Super 
Bowl for host cities. Baade and Matheson (2003a, 2003b) use metropolitan area personal 
income data to estimate the impacts of MLB's post-season and the Super Bowl on local 
economies. In all cases, the economic consequences of hosting these mega-events are 
statistically insignificant and, generally speaking about a tenth the size of the figures 
quoted by league and team boosters.  The prevailing opinion among economists is that 
while these sporting events may be large in a gross sense, because of crowding out, 
leakages, and substitution effects, the net influence on the host city is small.   
 
The one exception to this is rule is Coates and Humphreys (2002).  Their 
examination of post-season play in the NFL, NBA, and MLB, similar to all of the 
previous studies, finds that the cities hosting post-season play experience no significant 
increase in real per capita personal income.  In a very surprising discovery, however, they 
found that over the time period of their sample, 1969-1997, the city winning the Super 
Bowl experienced a statistically significant increase of roughly $140 in per capita 
income.   
 
This result is particularly surprising considering that the Super Bowl, unlike the 
championships in the other major professional sports, hockey, basketball, and baseball, is 
held at a pre-determined neutral site rather than at one of the participants' home fields. 
Therefore, while one might predict that the economies in the cities of the other sports' 
champions will be influenced by the economic activity surrounding the actual game(s), in 
the case of the Super Bowl, the winner's home town receives no direct revenue from the 
team's big victory since the win will likely take place thousands of miles away.  In fact, 
no Super Bowl champion has ever won the big game in their own home stadium. 
Furthermore, because of the NFL's single-game elimination playoff system, it is quite 
possible that the winning team may never have played even a single post-season game at 
home. 
 
A positive correlation between a championship and economic activity has some 
theoretical appeal, which most likely has a psychological basis.  As argued by Coates and 
Humphreys, if people in a community bask in the reflected glory of their team, that 
positive feeling could translate into greater productivity in the workplace.  It is debatable, 
of course, how pervasive that feeling is and how long it endures.  In fact, a further 
examination of victorious Super Bowl cities conducted by Matheson (2003) concluded 
that the economic impact from winning the Super Bowl was approximately one-third that 
estimated by Coates and Humphreys, and it was not statistically significant.  The 
collective evidence, therefore, would offer only tepid support for the thesis that winning 





  On the other hand, in today’s social climate there is reason to believe that a sports 
championship could exert a negative effect on the host city’s economy.  Both informal   10
and formal celebrations occur following championships. English football no longer holds 
a monopoly on sports-related violence, and the informal celebrations all too frequently 
degenerate into riots resulting in violence and the destruction of property, which will 
likely negatively affect productive activity in the short-run.  While violent celebrations 
first received widespread publicity following the NBA title won by the Detroit Pistons in 
the late 1980s, nowadays no sport seems to be immune from hooliganism as witnessed by 
the widespread arrests following the loss of the Purdue University women’s basketball 
team in the 2001 title game. Even orderly, well-organized formal celebrations may result 
in economic losses. Tickertape parades often result in business closings along parade 
routes for the day, and, if enough people participate could eliminate part or all of a 
workday for a substantial number of workers.   
 
  In using the same model discussed earlier to identify the economic impact of the 
Staples Center on the City of Los Angeles economy during the construction phase of the 
project, it was discovered that economic activity during the championship runs for the 
NBA Los Angeles Lakers during the 2000 and 2001 NBA seasons correlated negatively 
with City of Los Angeles taxable sales.  For the second quarter, the operation of Staples 
Center correlated negatively with economic activity in the City of Los Angeles.  It is 
possible that during the Lakers championship runs, people in sufficient numbers preferred 
to watch the games at home and spent less money as a consequence.  Testing this 
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this work, but it could be that winning a championship 
does have an economic cost other than the damage that unfortunately accompanies 
impromptu championship celebrations.  It should be noted, however, that the official 
celebration in Los Angeles closed Figueroa Street, a major commercial corridor, 
following Lakers championships in 2000, 2001, and 2002.  It would not be implausible 
that one-day of lost economic activity would translate into tens of millions of dollars of 
reduced taxable sales given the size of the Los Angeles economy.  Then too, people who 
ordinarily patronize businesses in the City would avoid doing so during the chaos and 
congestion that generally characterizes championship celebrations in sport.   
 
 
CHAMPIONSHIPS, THE GIFT THAT KEEPS ON TAKING 
 
  Evidence indicates that fans get burned basking in the warm glow of a team’s 
success.  In the parlance of economists, teams extract a portion of fan consumer surplus 
following a championship run.  Consider the evidence from the NFL and MLB.  Between 
1983 and 2000, the average ticket price for all NFL teams increased by 6.40 percent per 
year, while the ticket price for teams having won the Super Bowl the previous year 
averaged 12.0 percent during that same period of time.  Over the period 1992 through 
2002, the average MLB ticket price rose 6.97 percent, while ticket prices for the World 
Series champions rose 10.02 percent over that same time period.   
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
  Teams and leagues have used various arguments to enlist public financial support 
in the construction of professional sports facilities.  One argument has focused on the fact 
that in this era of player free agency, sports championships are won as much on the 
income statement as the playing field.  If teams are burdened with debt accumulated 
through privately financing stadium construction when the teams with whom they 
compete are not, then championships will not materialize.  Public subsidy advocates 
argue that championships not only bring fame but fortune to the host city.  This paper 
analyzed the proposition that championships materially benefit the host city and its fans.   
 
  The evidence does indicate that new stadiums do correlate with post-season play, 
but only if the incremental revenues spent from the operation of a new stadium are spent 
on acquiring players.  It should be noted, however, that the ability of a new stadium to 
secure a place in the playoffs is likely diminishing as more teams adopt this strategy.  In 
addition there is some evidence to indicate that there are negative costs associated with 
stadium construction and the actual achievement of a championship.  The preoccupation 
with some workers during the championship run coupled with business disruption during 
formal and informal celebrations make a championship a potentially expensive prize.  
Furthermore, the glow fans feel in the wake of their ascension to the top of the sports 
world will quickly dissipate fairly quickly as teams douse them with the equivalent of the 
contents of a Gatorade container, in the form of higher ticket prices.  Thus a warning to 
cities and fans, be careful what you wish for – sports championships may come at a 
substantial cost.     12
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